Money borrowing, gold smuggling and diamond mining : an Englishman in Pombaline circles by VANNESTE, Tijl
Money Borrowing, Gold Smuggling  
and Diamond Mining:  









This article sets out to investigate the nature and consequences of the personal 
relationship between the English parliamentarian, contrabandist, and diamond 
trader John Bristow and the Portuguese envoy in London and Secretary of State 
Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo. A micro-historical enquiry of this relationship 
can clarify a number of key elements in the eighteenth-century Pombaline reforms. 
It shows that these policies were influenced by personal connections and pragmatic 
considerations, perhaps as much as they were by the prevailing mercantilist ideas 









Este artigo propõe-se investigar a natureza e as consequências da relação pessoal 
entre o parlamentar Inglês, contrabandista, e comerciante de diamantes John 
Bristow e o enviado Português em Londres e Secretário de Estado, Sebastião José 
de Carvalho e Melo. Um inquérito de micro-histórica baseado nessa relação pode 
esclarecer uma série de elementos-chave das reformas pombalinas do século XVIII. 
Mostra que essas políticas foram influenciados por conexões pessoais e 
considerações pragmáticas, talvez tanto quanto os seus protagonistas estavam pelas 
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The Anglo-Portuguese Relationship 
 
Any history of Portugal’s economy during the eighteenth century is partly a history 
of its relationship with England. Historians have written at length about the nature of this 
relationship (Noya Pinto, 1979; Fisher, 1971; Sideri, 1970; Macedo, 1963). Essentially, the 
Spanish threat forced Portugal to obtain a long-term military and political ally, while the 
English were perfectly able to use Luso-Brazilian markets to export their manufactured 
goods to. The imports of Brazilian gold and diamonds further served to widen the trade 
imbalance in the long run (Maxwell, 1968: 612; Macedo, 1963: 46-47). Whether the Anglo-
Portuguese relationship established in the treaties of 1642, 1654, 1661 and 1703 (the 
Methuen Treaty) was beneficial (Fisher, 1963: 220) or detrimental (Sideri, 1970: 51-54) to 
Portugal’s economy is a question that remains unresolved (see also the essays in Cardoso et 
al., 2003), and contemporary voices already expressed their doubts about the nature of the 
economic relationship with England. The privileges that the English were granted, for 
instance, in their trade with Brazil, which had already been arranged on a monopolistic 
basis since the foundation of the Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil in 1649, were subject 
to scrutiny, and the country’s dependence on England was discussed by contemporary 
economic thinkers and government officials.  
Eighteenth-century economic reforms came to be strongly identified with the rise 
to power of Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, the future Marquis of Pombal. Portuguese 
historians still ponder the relationship between Pombal’s actions and the wider historical 
context of the time (Hespanha, 2007; Monteiro, 2006; Subtil, 2007), but there is no doubt 
that Pombal’s economic policies, while not entirely new, proved to be an important turning 
point in Portuguese economic history (Cardoso, 2005; Maxwell, 1995; Macedo, 1951). As 
José Subtil pointed out in his monograph on Pombal, Lisbon’s 1755 earthquake was also a 
political earthquake (Subtil, 2007) and momentum was created to adopt economic policies 
that would lead to a stronger, and more nationalized, Portuguese economy (Pereira, 2009: 
488-496). This enabled Pombal to maneuver himself closer to the king, at the center of 
political power (Monteiro, 2006: 81). From such a position, the new prime minister, who 
already had experience of foreign policy after diplomatic stints in London and Vienna and 
his appointment as minister of foreign affairs in the early 1750s, was able to implement an 
economic and political strategy intended to strengthen Portugal’s national economy, 
particularly in its relations with England.  
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Because of this, Pombal’s policy has often been labeled as “mercantilist”, but it 
went further than that (Macedo, 1966). Mercantilist techniques, such as the foundation of 
monopoly companies, were applied in order to create a class of Portuguese merchants who 
could compete with foreign traders (Maxwell, 1995: 67). This did not mean, however, that 
Pombal sought to destroy the privileged relationship with the English; he merely wished it 
to be more equivocal (Maxwell, 1995: 66). He also wanted to curtail English contraband 
trade in Lisbon, as the outflow of gold to England was immense, which was considered to 
be detrimental to the Portuguese economy (Sousa, 2006). In order to fully apprehend 
Pombal’s economic policy, it is crucial to understand its relationship with the previously 
established historical context of Portuguese dependence on English imports, traders, and 
shippers. Portuguese historians have rightly pointed out that it was not just Pombal himself 
who mattered, but that one also has to take into account the wider context (Cardoso, 2013; 
d’Azevedo, 1922). José Subtil argued that the agents of change after 1755 not only included 
Pombal, but also a network of “political accomplices” (Subtil, 2007).  
One could, of course, expand this notion to include economic accomplices, and 
this article will be concerned with one such accomplice, remarkably enough an 
Englishman, whose relationship with Pombal dated from the time of the latter’s stay in 
London as a Portuguese envoy. John Bristow was involved in trade with Portugal at that 
time, and would later move to Lisbon, where he became a well-known member of the 
English trade factory. This organization was founded in 1711 by 59 firms, which were 
mainly active in textiles, grain and the wine business, as well as general shipping and 
finance. Their business extended to the Portuguese colonies, Newfoundland, the 
Mediterranean and the home territory (Fisher, 1981: 23-44). The English factory in Lisbon 
was a legal entity, with the English Consul-General serving as its presiding officer. Disputes 
between English and Portuguese merchants were settled by a special judge. The trade 
factory had its own chapel and burial ground (Lodge, 1933: 225).2 Membership of the 
factory was crucial for English traders who were active in Lisbon, and was not free of 
charge. An annual tax had to be paid, the amount of which depended on the total volume 
of trade imports made by a particular merchant (Walford, 1940: 33-36).  
Many of these merchants acted on their own behalf, but they also worked as agents 
for firms in London. It was the Lisbon-based firm of Bristow, Warde & C° that acted as an 
agent for the initially London-based trader John Bristow (Sutherland, 1984a: 372). Bristow 
was born in 1701, became a Member of Parliament in 1734, and acted as a director and 
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governor of the South Sea Company between 1730 and 1761.3 Bristow was a man of a 
certain financial standing, as shown by his subscription of £150,000 in an English 
government loan in 1744 (Shaw, 1998: 89; Dickson, 1993: 289), but he lost his fortune in 
the aftermath of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake. In 1749, he was one of the partners in a 
company that also included Samson Gideon, a wealthy Jewish-turned-Christian financer, 
and Francis Salvador, a highly successful Anglo-Jewish diamond trader, and who was 
commissioned to deliver three million ounces of silver to the East India Company, to be 
used in the purchase of Indian diamonds.4 From the 1750s onwards, he resided in the 
Portuguese capital, and he died there in 1768, leaving a lot of financial debts behind.5 
Before his fall, it is important to consider his rise within an Anglo-Portuguese context, a 
rise that had begun at a time when Pombal was active in politics, but not yet the powerful 
figure he was to become after 1755.  
 
Brazilian Contraband from Lisbon to London 
 
Gold was a central issue in the Anglo-Portuguese relationship. In the late 
seventeenth century, the discovery of gold deposits in the interior heartland of Brazil led to 
a true gold rush (Higgins. 1999: 17-42; Antonil 1967: 119-123). While this served to 
revitalize a Portuguese economy that was already in a state of crisis (Boxer, 1969: 456) and 
to balance the trade deficit (Godinho, 2005: 326), it also “provided England with a new and 
essential source of bullion” (Sideri, 1970: 49). In a good year, such as 1725, 20,000 
kilograms of Brazilian gold reached Portugal (Godinho, 1953: 83), and Charles Boxer has 
suggested that between half and three quarters of that amount had found its way to 
England (Boxer, 1962: 157). The exact volume of Brazilian gold that made it to Portugal 
and England during the eighteenth century is not known, partly because of the difficulty in 
estimating contraband, and research continues to be undertaken to determine both the 
quantitative and qualitative ramifications of gold movements (Costa, Rocha and Sousa, 
2010; Sousa 2000). Historians have long agreed on the imbalance that Brazilian gold helped 
to create or deepen in the Anglo-Portuguese relationship. It provided a boost to the 
English economy, by contributing to the monetization of England, or even, in the long 
                                                            
3  See http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1715-1754/member/bristow-john-1701-68 
(consulted on 16/09/2015). 
4 Entry on 21/03/1749, Court Minute Book 63 E.I.C., British Library/India Office Records (BL/IOR), B/70, 
ff. 631-633. For Gideon, see Sutherland (1984b). Francis Salvador and his relationship with Bristow and the 
Portuguese government are discussed below. 
5 Shaw (1998: 89). He figures as a character in a novel set in the earthquake-stricken Lisbon of 1755 (Müller, 
2010). 
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run, to its Industrial Revolution, as pointed out by Adam Smith. Brazilian gold also proved 
to be an impediment to Portuguese economic development. John Richards, for instance, 
pointed out that the Brazilian gold rush contributed to the migration of 400,000 
Portuguese to Brazil, one fifth of the total population of 1700, which was detrimental to 
Portuguese industry (Richards, 2003: 405). The growing dependence on English imports 
also prevented the development of a proper Portuguese industry (Sideri, 1970: 40-83), and 
no nation liked to see its bullion leave, whether it was gold or silver. In England, for 
instance, it was forbidden to export domestic bullion.6  
English merchants became heavily involved in smuggling gold and bullion out of 
Portugal. Magalhães Godinho wrote that “the vessels of the King of England generally 
arrived in Lisbon at the same time as the fleets from Brazil, of course completely by 
chance. […] During the night, a good part of the undeclared gold was unloaded onto the 
English vessels” (Godinho, 2005: 330). This practice led Malachy Postlethwayt to remark 
that the discontent of the Portuguese government with regard to clandestine bullion 
exports should not be exclusively blamed upon England. In his opinion, other countries 
benefited as much from Brazilian gold, because the English were transporters, taking the 
gold to different nations (Postlethwayt, 1774; Pedreira, 2003 and 1994). The Portuguese 
were well aware of the central role played by English ships in gold smuggling, which led to 
various clashes on the waterfront between Portuguese soldiers and English seafarers. King 
João V was even able to witness these quarrels from his palace window. English diplomats 
complained of Royal Navy captains accepting contraband gold and diamonds on board 
their vessels. Furthermore, the frequent announcements in English newspapers of the 
arrivals of Brazilian gold did not go unnoticed, and such indiscretion irritated both sides 
(Boxer, 1969: 464-469).  
Bullion was not the only commodity that found its way into England illegally. 
Diamonds had been discovered in Brazil in the early eighteenth century. Their extraction 
was initially free, and older European trade networks distributing Asian diamonds quickly 
came to incorporate Brazilian stones (Vanneste, 2011: 50-57; Yogev, 1978, Chapter 7). 
Diamonds were regularly smuggled in order to avoid the payment of duties. Diplomatic 
correspondence between English representatives in Lisbon and London shows that 
English merchants were heavily involved in the diamond contraband trade. 7  English 
                                                            
6 The ban on the export of domestic specie is also noticeable in the shipments of silver made by diamond 
merchants to India. All the silver was foreign. Court Minute Books 60-68 E.I.C. (1742-1760), BL/IOR, B/67-
B/75. For the profitability of bullion trade with Portugal, see Sutherland (1984a). 
7 For a description of a number of cases and the role played therein by the special envoy Lord Tyrawly, see 
Francis (1985: 55-62). 
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merchants active in the Indian diamond trade shipped out jewellery, silver, coral, and 
polished diamonds, in order to obtain rough diamonds in return (Yogev, 1978). 
Considering the problematic nature of the remittances of Brazilian gold to London, uncut 
diamonds proved to be a good alternative, particularly considering their small size and the 
fact that the trade with Europe was not regulated until the 1750s. 8  This fact was 
acknowledged by the English consul in Lisbon in 1732, when he wrote to the Duke of 
Newcastle, Secretary of State, saying that “as there is no Law in being against the importing 
of diamonds, & as they are more easily Concealed than Gold, I believe a great many have 
escaped the Kings Hands, & indeed less severity has been used for the discovery of them 
… the Penalty of running Gold is very great, no less than Confiscation, with Banishment 
or the Gallies.”9 
One of the merchants who found himself caught up in diamond contraband was 
John Bristow. In 1735, he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, saying that precious stones had 
been seized on board a ship moored in the Lisbon harbor, and that a lawsuit was pending. 
Bristow urged the Duke to instruct Lord Tyrawly, the special English envoy to the 
Portuguese capital, to provide assistance. 10  Seventeen years later, in early 1752, the 
Portuguese customs suspected that Bristow was trying to export bullion on board an 
English ship, the Lyme. On January 29, a customs officer came to Bristow’s house to 
inform him of the pending search of the ship for bullion. On the ship, it came to a 
confrontation with sailors, and guns were drawn.11  
English merchants, including John Bristow, complained that the law against bullion 
exports was old and obsolete and that its enforcement would greatly harm English trade.12 
They also expressed their grievances over the aggressive attack on Bristow’s house, in full 
sight of many people, based on what they claimed was false information. Lord Tyrawly was 
called upon to resolve the friction that had arisen, but he soon wrote to England that the 
merchants’ complaints were not substantial enough and that Bristow’s claims had no 
foundation.13 Furthermore, the merchant committee led by Bristow lost its support among 
                                                            
8 However, the mining had been organized as a monopoly since 1739 (Vanneste, 2011: 51). 
9  Charles Compton to the Duke of Newcastle, 12/01/1732, Lisbon, National Archives, State Papers 
(NA/SP) 89/37, ff. 141-145, on f. 142r. 
10 Duke of Newcastle to Lord Tyrawly, Whitehall, 28/10/1735, NA/SP 89/36, ff. 190-192. 
11 A narrative of the reasons, which constrained the underwritten Bristow’s, Warde & Company to the Committee of the 
Factory (no minister or consul from His Majesty being then resident here) for their assistance and support in so critical a 
situation, Lisbon, 22/06/1752, BL, Add. 23634 (Tyrawly Papers; Correspondence of Lord Tyrawly when 
ambassador in Portugal, 1752-1757), ff. 86-87. 
12 Committee of the English factory to Lord Tyrawly, Lisbon, 22/06/1752, BL, Add. 23634, ff. 104-105. 
13 Lord Tyrawly to Lord Holderness, Lisbon, 25/06/1752, BL, Add. 23634, ff. 106-111. 
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the other members of the English Factory, who labeled them as “silly Ignorant 
wrongheaded men.”14 Bristow’s actions were seen as “intrigues.”15  
 
Encounters in London: Money & Politics 
 
For John Bristow, however, it did not matter much that he had fallen out of favor 
with his colleagues. By the time it happened, he could rely on a powerful ally, the Marquis 
of Pombal. Named Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and War in July, 1750, Sebastião 
de Carvalho e Melo quickly set about reforming Portugal’s economic and imperial policy. 
His desire was to “fortify the nation’s bargaining power within the Atlantic commercial 
system” (Maxwell, 1995: 67), and to that purpose he used “mercantilist techniques” to 
create a national bourgeoisie of Portuguese merchants who would eventually have the 
financial and commercial power to challenge foreign traders (Madureira, 1997b; França, 
1983; Carreira 1983). 
Pombal’s plans to improve Portugal’s economy through the strengthening of a 
national commercial class did not, however, exclude the participation of foreign merchants 
and financers, as long as they served under the Portuguese political order. He was 
sufficiently pragmatic in his approach not to alienate the English interest in Portugal, and a 
Portuguese official wrote to Bristow about the smuggling case, saying that the English 
merchants did not need to fear bad consequences, as he was assured that the Secretary of 
State was well aware of the commercial interests at stake.16 Three months later, the 
merchants involved wrote to Lord Tyrawly that Pombal had personally intervened, 
asserting that the consequences would be dangerous if Portuguese authorities tried to stop 
the bullion exports to England.17  
Pombal’s pragmatic attitude is not so difficult to explain in the light of early 
modern Anglo-Portuguese relations, but in most historiographic contributions on Pombal’s 
economic reform, his development of a direct relationship with actual English merchants 
as a tool in his policy has remained virtually ignored. In order to comprehend Pombal’s 
efforts to create a strong Portuguese mercantile class in order to assert Portugal’s place in 
the greater economic system to its own advantage, it is important to understand what steps 
                                                            
14 Johan Mayne, Isaac Mollortie, Tom Chace, Phillip Jackson, S.l., S.d., BL, Add. 23634, f. 159.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Antonio Luiz de Oliveira to John Bristow, Lisbon, 18/03/1752, BL, Add. 23634, f. 38. 
17 A narrative, Lisbon, 22/06/1752, BL, Add. 23634, ff. 86-87. 
Vanneste  Money Borrowing, Gold Smuggling and Diamond Mining 
e-JPH, Vol. 13, number 2, December 2015  87 
he took, and which people he decided to rely upon. John Bristow was one of these people, 
and, considering his background in smuggling, an unlikely but perhaps suitable candidate.  
Pombal and Bristow had known each other from the time when they both lived in 
London, the former as a diplomatic envoy, and the latter as a merchant actively involved in 
trade with Portugal. When Pombal arrived in the English capital in 1738, the residence of 
the Portuguese ambassador was in a poor condition. In 1740, he requested permission to 
move to a more expensive residence, which also had a chapel. The purchase of that house 
and the necessary repairs would cost 9,000 cruzados. In November, 1740, the decision was 
made to rent the house, located in Audrey Street. The person who paid the deposit to the 
landlord was Francis Salvador. 18  Salvador was one of the most successful diamond 
merchants of his day, with a large stake in the trade with India.19 He came from a Sephardic 
Jewish family that had left Portugal for Amsterdam and London in the seventeenth 
century, but he had maintained a connection with the Portuguese government. When the 
discovery of Brazilian diamonds led to a fall in prices on the European markets, Francis 
Salvador was asked for advice by Portuguese officials. His suggestion to close down the 
Brazilian mines entirely was taken up by the Crown between 1735 and 1739. In retrospect, 
Pombal thought this advice came from Salvador’s interests in the Anglo-Indian diamond 
trade, and he remarked in a later manuscript dealing with a history of the diamond trade 
that it “brought the famous Hebrew great joy.” A few lines later, he labeled Salvador’s 
suggestions as “sinister counsel.”20  
At the time, however, Portuguese officials seemed content with Salvador’s services, 
and even sought to use them a second time. In 1738, the Portuguese had to deal with the 
Maratha invasion of the island of Salsete, off the coast of Bombay. It was the year in which 
Pombal had taken office in London, and through the intermediation of Salvador, he started 
talking to the directors of the East India Company, at Salvador’s house.21 The failure of a 
plan to send English ships to assist the Portuguese settlement on Salsete led Pombal to 
consider the idea that Portugal should take care of itself, and that a Companhia Geral do 
Oriente should be founded. To that end, Francis Salvador was instructed to purchase ships 
                                                            
18 Antonio Guedes Pereira and Marco Antonio de Azevedo Coutinho to Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, 
Lisbon, 20/02/1742, BL, Add. 20800 (Cartas diplomaticas de Lisboa para Londres; 1738-1745), ff. 342-43. 
19 For more on the Salvador family, see Woolf (1962-1967) and Vanneste (2011: 124-139 and 150-162). 
20 “cauzou ao dito Famozo Hebreo huma grande alegria” and “os seus sinistros conselhos,” Deducçaó Compendiosa dos 
Contractos de Mineraçaó dos diamantes; dos outros contractos da Extracçaó delles; dos cofres de Lisboa para os Payzes 
Estrangeiros; dos perigos em que todos laboravam e das Providencias, comque a elles occorreo o senhor Rey Dom Jozeph para os 
conservar, S.d., Biblioteca Nacional Lisbon, Colecção Pombalina (BNL/CP), Códice 695, ff. 306-80, on f. 311r. 
21 Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, London, 02/12/1738. BL, Add. 20798 (Cartas diplomaticas de Londres para 
Lisboa 1738-1739. Cartaz de oficio ao Secretario do Estado e scriptaes por Sebastiaó Joze de Carvalho e Mello desde a cidade 
de Londres no anno de 1738), ff. 26-28. See also the letters from 21/11/1738 and 15/12/1738. 
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on behalf of the Portuguese government.22 In February, 1740, news began to circulate that 
Francis Salvador had bought the warship Cumberland, which was to sail to Macau.23  
Things turned sour when Salvador reclaimed the loans that he had made for 
obtaining and repairing the Portuguese envoy’s residence. Two repayments were made to 
him in 1745, and although work on the chapel ended in 1746, Portuguese officials did not 
make any more efforts to repay Salvador.24 Instead, they complained about the pressure put 
upon them by the Jewish diamond trader.25 In November, Francis Salvador wrote directly 
to Pombal to resolve the issue in a friendly manner.26 A month later, nothing had changed: 
“Francis Salvador persecutes me strongly about delivering the new chapel [for use], for 
which he has the keys, but I answer him that I will not do so without the orders of Your 
Excellency.”27 It seems that the lack of haste on the Portuguese side had to do with a 
shortage of financial means, which had made them turn to Salvador in the first place. In 
order to obtain the necessary sum, the merchant John Bristow was consulted. After some 
talks, Bristow was prepared to lend money to the Portuguese government, and, in 
February, 1747, Francis Salvador was finally reimbursed the sum of £2,417.28  
 
The Diamond Monopoly: Families of Trade, Foreigners of Influence 
 
It seems that Pombal had not forgotten Bristow’s financial help when he came to 
the latter’s rescue five years later. More than just simply pressuring Portuguese customs 
into letting the Bristow affair go, Pombal decided to incorporate John Bristow into one of 
his plans to reshape the Luso-Brazilian commercial system. When the Brazilian diamond 
mines re-opened in 1739, the business of extraction became a monopoly (Ferreira, 2009). 
Between 1749 and 1752, it was in the hands of Brazilian-born Felisberto Caldeira Brant. In 
1751, however, Caldeira Brant fell from grace as it became known that he was heavily 
involved in smuggling and corruption. At the same time, Pombal was negotiating at the 
                                                            
22 “Com Francisco Salvador continuey as conversaçoes depois de o conhecer intereçado na Companhia,” Sebastião José de 
Carvalho e Melo, London, 20/01/1739, BL, Add. 20798, ff. 85-87. 
23 Antonio Guedes Pereira and Marco Antonio de Azevedo Coutinho to Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, 
Lisbon, 19/02/1740, BL, Add. 20801 (Cartas para Londres 1738-1742), ff. 5-7. 
24 Francisco Caetano to Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, London, 30/12/1745, BL, Add. 20797 (Cartas de 
Londres 1745-1747), ff. 83-85. 
25 Francisco Caetano to Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, London, 12/08/1746, BL, Add. 20797, ff. 178-
179. See also the letters of 16/08/1746 on ff. 180-181, 23/08/1746 on ff. 192-193 and 16/09/1746 on f. 197. 
26 Francis Salvador to Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, London, 04/11/1746, BL, Add. 20797, f. 218. 
27 “Francisco Salvador me persegue fortemente para que tome entregue da Capella Nova, de que elle tem as chaves, porem eu lhe 
respondo que o naó faço sem ordem de V.E.,” Francisco Caetano to Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, London, 
09/12/1746, BL, Add. 20797, ff. 229-30. 
28 Francis Salvador to Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, London, 16/02/1747, BL, Add. 20797, ff. 257-58. 
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Lisbon court with the previous contract-holder, Portuguese-born João Fernandes de 
Oliveira. The latter was awarded the new contract, but Brant’s clandestine activities had led 
to a failure of credit links that stretched all the way to Lisbon. Pombal decided to change 
the manner in which Brazilian diamonds were traded in Europe, a practice that had 
hitherto been free. In a manuscript concerned with the history of the Brazilian diamond 
trade, he wrote that he gave himself eight days away from the royal court to come up with a 
plan, a period “in which I could be locked in my office, without being interrupted.”29  
Pombal wanted to turn Brazilian diamond trade in Europe into a separate 
commercial monopoly, and one of his motivations was to construct a Christian trade 
network in opposition to the Jewish merchants who dominated the diamond trade.30 In his 
mind, the company that would receive this privilege had to be Dutch or English, in view of 
their expertise, credit, and capital. The name John Bristow came to the fore. He had already 
proposed to offer the Portuguese government the 700,000 cruzados they needed to 
reimburse the protested bills of exchange that had been used by Felisberto Caldeira Brant 
to obtain credit. In February 1753, almost one year after his involvement in the smuggling 
of bullion to England, the king agreed to Bristow’s proposal and granted him the 
monopoly to sell Brazilian diamonds for a period of six years.31 The contract was signed on 
the tenth of August 1753, and its contents were to remain secret.32 Bristow wasn’t the sole 
party in the enterprise, as he had established a partnership with the Dutch merchant 
Herman Joseph Braamcamp, a former representative for Prussia at the Portuguese court, 
who had tried in vain to obtain the mining monopoly a few years earlier.33 Four days later, 
news was already spreading in Lisbon. A Huguenot firm wrote to its correspondent in 
Antwerp, stating that “the House of Bristows Warde & C° it is said is contracting some say 
for the Brazeel diamonds that are actually in the King’s coffers in the mint of the old 
contract and others say that tis for thoze that are to come of the new.”34  
It seems that Pombal’s pragmatism in relation to the English had catapulted a 
smuggler at odds with his fellow merchants into a very powerful position. But Bristow’s 
luck would not last for long. News reached Pombal that Bristow’s company had associated 
                                                            
29 Deducçaó, f. 324r..  
30 Deducçaó, f. 326v. 
31 Deducçaó, f. 330v. 
32 Alvará de 11/08/1753, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, Collecção de Leis, Maço 4, N°144.  
33 Deducçaó, ff. 324r-326v. See also Brandão 2002: 144 
34  Berthon & Garnault to James Dormer, Lisbon, 14/08/1753, Felixarchief Antwerp, IB1652. They 
confirmed Bristow’s involvement in the contract as well as the participation of Herman Braamcamp’s brother 
Gerard in Amsterdam on 09/10/1753. 
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itself with the Jewish trader Francis Salvador.35 Pombal disliked the Jews, and held a 
personal grudge against Salvador. To make matters worse, the earthquake that struck 
Lisbon in 1755 led directly to the bankruptcy of Bristow, Warde & C°, and Bristow could 
no longer fulfill his contractual obligations, leading to a termination of the contract in 1756. 
Portuguese officials were instructed to look for merchants in London who could take over 
the contract, which would remain in foreign hands until the end of the century.  
Together with a sustained Anglo-Dutch presence in the diamond trade, Pombal 
also incorporated Portuguese merchants into the administration of the diamond contracts, 
a strategy that was very much in line with his attempts to create a national commercial 
bourgeoisie to occupy key positions in Portuguese industries and trade monopolies. José 
Francisco da Cruz and José Rodrigues Bandeira were appointed as diamond administrators 
in Lisbon,36 positions that their families continued to hold until the end of the eighteenth 
century (Rodrigues, 1982: 19). Pedro Quintela became the monopoly holder in 1790, 
purchasing 158,168 carats of diamonds between 1791 and 1800 (Rabello, 1997: 177). 
Members of these three families represented 29 per cent of the financial value of 
investments in Brazilian diamonds to be paid back in 1770.37 These families were part of 
the grupo dos tabaqueiros, people involved in the tobacco contract, including also the Ferreira, 
Fernandes Bandeira, Machado, Braamcamp and other families (Pedreira, 1996: 361; Costa, 
1992; França, 1983). They were also involved in the junta do comércio, the Pernambuco and 
Grão Pará & Maranhão trading companies, and several Lisbon factories (Madureira, 1997a; 
Maxwell, 1995: 74-75; Nunes Dias, 1968: 37; Macedo, 1951: 141-143).38  
Brazilian diamonds were an important commercial connection between this 
Portuguese commercial oligarchy and a number of foreign traders, but these groups also 
became linked socially, through marriage. Anselmo José da Cruz, the brother of the 
diamond administrator José Francisco, had a daughter who married Geraldo Wenceslão 
Braamcamp, the son of Herman Braamcamp, who had been involved in the first diamond 
trade monopoly together with John Bristow, and was a director in the Pernambuco 
Company (Maxwell, 1995: 74). Geraldo later became the first Baron of Sobral (Affonso 
and Valdez, 1988: 350). Daniel Gildemeester, the holder of the diamond monopoly 
between 1761 and 1783 had a son who married Maria Teresa Machado. Earlier, Daniel had 
                                                            
35 Deducçaó, f. 337v 
36 Deducçaó, f. 346r. 
37 Letras sobre o contrato dos diamantes que há para pagar, e dias dos seus vencimentos (1770). BNL/PB, Códice 691, f. 
18. 
38 On Anselmo José da Cruz and his two brothers, see Lisboa (2009). 
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opposed the marriage of one of his sons in a conversation with a Quintela (Bombelles, 
1979: 129-130). 
This confirms that foreign merchants could rise to important commercial positions 
within the Portuguese economy, but not without becoming linked to a cosmopolitan 
Portuguese bourgeoisie. A simple dichotomy in which Pombal tried to push Portuguese 
merchants into influential commercial positions at the expense of foreign traders cannot be 
maintained as an explanation. While Pombal’s policies need to be inscribed in a wider 
historical context in which Portugal’s commercial dependency on England was questioned, 
it is also important to acknowledge Pombal’s pragmatism and his readiness to include 




Historians studying the development of the Portuguese economy in the eighteenth 
century have rightly stressed the importance of the historical context of Anglo-Portuguese 
relations and the cataclysm of 1755, which led to a Portuguese diplomat becoming the 
most prominent figure in the higher echelons of government. While there is no doubting 
the importance of analyzing these events within a wider international economic context, a 
micro-historical approach that looks at relationships between people rather than at 
relationships between economic and political structures can be equally revealing. 
The Marquis of Pombal’s efforts to build a Portuguese merchant class ready to 
compete with foreign traders in terms of finance, commercial power and industrial 
development were a logical consequence of re-thinking the century-old relationship 
between England and Portugal within a “mercantilist” framework. It should, however, be 
remembered that Pombal was pragmatic enough to understand that the expansion of the 
Portuguese economy on these terms could never take place without preserving the Anglo-
Portuguese relationship, and without benefitting from the personal experience and capital 
of a number of well-to-do foreign merchants. It remains remarkable, however, that his 
decision to rely upon English commercial expertise brought Pombal to John Bristow, a 
known contrabandist. This cannot be satisfactorily explained within the traditional 
narrative of Anglo-Portuguese relations. Looking at personal relationships hints at an 
interdependency of foreign and Portuguese merchants that was economic, political and 
socio-cultural. Much of this came to fruition because of Pombal’s English past, and the 
connections he had maintained from that period.  
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